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INTRODUCTION

Strong antitakeover defenses are common among publicly traded
firms. Why do firms adopt such arrangements? Does the adoption of
such arrangements indicate that a board veto over takeovers enhances
share value? What explains the fact that, at the initial public offering
(IPO) stage, firms adopt strong takeover provisions, such as effective
staggered boards, which shareholders systematically reject midstream?
To what extent should corporate law place limits on a firm's choice of
antitakeover arrangements? This Article seeks to address each of
these questions.
Firms opt for antitakeover protection in two main ways, both of
which have attracted some attention. First, firms adopt antitakeover
charter provisions. Recent work has documented that, in the last decade, firms choosing to go public have increasingly been incorporating
such provisions into their charters.1 Second, firms incorporate in
states that have statutes or case law making takeovers difficult. Recent
evidence indicates that states with more antitakeover statutes are more
successful in attracting incorporations
Supporters of board veto have argued that the adoption of
antitakeover arrangements at the IPO stage provides "market proof'
that board veto is desirable for shareholders.3 Their inference i$
I For studies documenting the widespread use of antitakeover provisions in the
charters of firms going public during the 1990s, see John C. Coates IV, Explaining
Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301 (2001); Robert
Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO ChartersMaximize Firm Value? Antitakeover Protection
in IPOs, 17J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 95-97 (2001); Laura Casares Field & Jonathan M.
Karpoff, Takeover Defenses of IPO Firms,57J. FIN. 1857, 1858 (2002).
2 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, Firms'DecisionsWhere to Incorporate, 46
J.L. & ECON. 383, 404-20 (2003) (presenting evidence that states with more antitakeover statutes are more successful both in retaining in-state firms and in attracting outof-state incorporations); Lucian Bebchuk et al., Does the Evidence Favor State Competition
in Corporate Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1775, 1815-18 (2002) (surveying and discussing the
evidence on how states' takeover laws affect incorporation decisions); Guhan Subramanian, The Influence of Antitakeover Statutes on Incorporation Choice: Evidence on the
"Race"Debateand Antitakeover Overreaching,150 U. PA. L. REv. 1795, 1838 (2002) (finding that firms are less likely to incorporate out-of-state when their state has more antitakeover statutes).
3 For arguments that firms' adoption of antitakeover provisions in their
IPO charters implies that such provisions are likely to enhance shareholder value, see Stephen J.
Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in CorporateLaw, 87 VA. L.
REV. 961, 982-86 (2001); Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Constitutionalism:
Antitakeover Charter Provisions as Precommitment, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (2003); Martin
Lipton, Pills, Polls, and Professors Redux, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 1037, 1057-58 (2002);Jonathan R. Macey, DisplacingDelaware: Can the Feds Do Better than the States in Regulating
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unwarranted, however, because the evidence about shareholder preferences for antitakeover protections are, to say the least, rather mixed.
While the adoption of antitakeover protections at the IPO stage has
increased over the last decade, shareholder opposition to antitakeover
protections through voting decisions has increased as well.4 This
seemingly contradictory evidence makes it necessary to have a theory
sufficiently rich to account for the behavior of firms and investors
both at the IPO stage and in midstream.
I identify and work out below several possible explanations that
can account for both IPO and midstream behavior.6 First, under the
explanation based on encouraging deconcentration of ownership, antitakeover provisions serve the interests of shareholders when firms
go public. In the absence of such arrangements, founders would
be discouraged from subsequently reducing their holdings and
relinquishing the lock on control that comes with concentrated ownership. Under this explanation, while public investors would fare best
under dispersed ownership with weak antitakeover provisions, having
strong antitakeover provisions in the IPO charter is still preferable
because it results in less entrenchment. Thus, antitakeover provisions
are desirable at the IPO stage only because they encourage founders
to break up their control blocks. Then, once ownership is sufficiently
dispersed so that the votes of public investors matter, the benefits of

Takeovers?, 57 Bus. LAw. 1025, 1039 (2002); Lynn A. Stout, Do Antitakeover Defenses Decrease Shareholder Wealth? The Ex Post/Ex Ante Valuation Problem, 55 STAN. L. REV. 845,
847-56 (2002); John Elofson, What if They Gave a Shareholder Revolution and Nobody
Came? Poison Pills, Binding Shareholder Resolutions and the Coase Theorem 4 (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
4 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalismand Corporate
Law: The Race
to ProtectManagersfrom Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1168, 1187 (1999) (discussing the
implications of this midstream behavior for an assessment of shareholders' preferences); see also Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federal Intervention to Enhance
Shareholder Choice, 87 VA. L. REV. 993, 999-1001 (2001) (refuting claims that if a shareholder opt-in rule were beneficial, it would have been adopted already).
5 Michael Klausner, Institutional Shareholders, PrivateEquity,
and Antitakeover Protection at the IPO Stage, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 755 (2003), also stresses the conflicting patterns
of IPO and midstream behavior and the need to reconcile them. His analysis focuses
on the firms with private equity funding, where some of the institutional investors
regularly voting against antitakeover provisions are also investors in the private equity
funds taking public firms with such provisions.
6 As I shall note, some of the suggested explanations are new, while others build
on earlier works written by myself and by others. For all explanations, my analysis
seeks to contribute by working out fully the explanation, examining the extent to
which it can explain empirical patterns and describing its implications for legal policy.
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antitakeover protections disappear. This change can explain the midstream opposition of such investors to antitakeover arrangements.
Under the efficient rent protection explanation, antitakeover arrangements are always undesirable for public investors and reduce the value
of their shares. However, the benefits of rent protection obtained by
the founders through the antitakeover provisions are, at least at the
IPO stage, greater than the resulting reduction in share price that the
provisions cause. Therefore, antitakeover arrangements are efficient
overall, and assuming no informational problems, founders find it in
their interest to adopt them at the IPO stage even though this reduces
the price they can get for their shares. At the midstream stage, however, shareholders have every reason to vote against a proposed antitakeover arrangement unless they receive appropriate compensation
for the resulting reduction in the value of their shares. Similarly, if
they could undo the antitakeover arrangement, shareholders would
likely vote to do so midstream.
Under agency cost explanations, antitakeover arrangements may be
adopted even though they are inefficient. That is, the cost to the preIPO shareholders from reduced IPO revenues caused by such arrangements is smaller than the rent protection benefits they would receive. And, given that antitakeover provisions reduce share value,
shareholders can be expected to vote against such arrangements in
midstream. The question remains, however, as to why pre-IPO shareholders adopt such arrangements. The answer given is that agency
problems on the side of the pre-IPO shareholders lead them to adopt
inefficient charter provisions.
One type of agency problem could arise among IPO shareholders.
Here, when only some of the pre-IPO shareholders will continue to
run the firm after the IPO, these founder-managers might have an incentive to include antitakeover arrangements in the charter. After all,
they will fully capture the benefits of rent protection and will bear
only part of the cost of reduced IPO share price.
Another type of agency problem could arise between lawyers and preIPO shareholders. To the extent that lawyers' expertise gives them
influence over decision making, they might have an incentive to tilt
their recommendations in favor of antitakeover arrangements. The
downside of not having antitakeover protection-that incumbents
might find themselves unprotected from a hostile bid down the
road-might be attributed to the lawyers and might negatively affect
their reputation. Furthermore, the potential upside of not including
antitakeover provisions-a slightly higher IPO share price-would
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hardly be credited to the lawyers' work. Thus, since the adoption of
antitakeover provisions provides a benefit but little cost to lawyers,
they have an incentive to use their influence over the drafting of the
charter to encourage antitakeover arrangements, even though these
arrangements are inefficient for both founders and shareholders.
Under the asymmetric information theory, public investors are assumed to have perfect information about the effect of the provision
given any value of the company's assets, but to have imperfect information about the value of these assets. In such a case, assuming that
higher asset value is associated with higher expected benefits from
rent protection, some or all founders will have an incentive to signal a
high asset value by adopting antitakeover arrangements. Although
shareholders know that antitakeover arrangements are inefficient and
will reduce the share price at the IPO stage accordingly, the increase
in share price as a result of the information conveyed concerning asset
value outweighs this negative antitakeover consequence. Thus, the
signaling effect may provide founders with an incentive to adopt inefficient antitakeover provisions at the IPO stage. Shareholders, however, will oppose such inefficient protections in midstream.
Last, but not least, under the bounded attention theory, investors at
the IPO stage do not bother to price antitakeover arrangements that
fall within a certain set of conventional arrangements. The exact location of the firm's choice within this set is viewed as relatively less important than the other uncertainties involved in valuing a closely held
company that is going public. Without the aid of prior market pricing
and exposure to market analysis, the level of uncertainty about the
value of the company's assets and management is relatively high. Furthermore, the consequences of the chosen antitakeover arrangement
would have impact primarily down the road after shares become more
dispersed. As a result, even if investors view some antitakeover arrangements as theoretically inefficient, they might not bother to factor them into the price they are willing to pay for IPO shares.
In contrast, down the road at the midstream stage, questions concerning antitakeover arrangements will come to a vote in circumstances that make investors focus on the issue in isolation from others
and that make the issue practically important. At this latter point, the
inefficiency of antitakeover arrangements will lead shareholders to
vote against them.
In addition to identifying several potentially plausible explanations
for observed IPO and midstream patterns, I also discuss why some
other potential explanations, including ones put forward by Marcel
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Kahan and Ed Rock, Lynn Stout, and Michael Klausner, cannot account for these patterns. I thus attempt to provide a comprehensive
review of the factors that contribute to producing the observed patterns of behavior.
I also discuss in some detail the policy implications of the analysis.
First, I argue that the evidence provides no basis for believing that a
board veto is a beneficial default for public investors of companies
with dispersed ownership. To be sure, there are explanations under
which such arrangements would be desirable if they were clearly made
a part of the bargain in the IPO stage. Under all explanations, however, the value of public investors' shares in companies with dispersed
ownership is lower under a board veto regime, and there is no reason
to impose such a regime on companies in midstream as some judicial
decisions and antitakeover statutes have done.
Second, an analysis of possible explanations for the adoption of
IPO antitakeover arrangements hardly reassures us that the selection
of corporate governance provisions at the IPO stage represents the
fine and careful optimization that some influential views claim it does.
Although the considered empirical patterns do not rule out the possibility that IPO arrangements are optimal, they are equally supportive
of accounts that view IPO choices as rather imperfect. Thus, the longstanding legal policy of providing IPO firms with a menu of limited
options, rather than with unlimited contractual freedom, might well
be wise. When an arrangement seems sufficiently likely to reduce
overall value, it may be efficient not to permit shareholders to adopt it
in their IPO charters. For example, it might well be desirable to exclude staggered boards from the menu of options even if it is desirable to permit opting out into arrangements that provide directors
with a longer horizon.
Third, the analysis highlights the difference between what might
be optimal at the IPO stage and what might be optimal down the
road. Even if certain measures that benefit managers and controllers
are to be permitted at the IPO stage, it is not necessarily the case that
companies should be permitted to adopt such measures for an indefinite term. State corporate law has thus far opted to either prohibit
a given arrangement or permit its adoption for an indefinite period.
An additional and potentially valuable strategy is to permit firms
to adopt provisions that opt out of the law's default but (unless the
charter is amended to re-adopt them) remain in place no longer than
a specified period. The potential value of this strategy is suggested by
the analysis of the differences between the IPO and midstream stages.
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Fourth, the lessons of the analysis carry over to other corporate
governance questions. In particular, we should not automatically infer that arrangements adopted at the IPO stage must enhance shareholder value. Furthermore, there are reasons to be skeptical about
claims for complete contractual freedom in IPO charters. Some limits
on the menu of permissible choices, and some use of sunset provisions, might well be warranted.
The analysis of this Article is organized as follows. Part I describes
the conflicting evidence of shareholder preference for antitakeover
provisions. Part II then develops and analyzes alternative explanations
for the difference in firm and investor behavior between the IPO and
midstream stages. Finally, Part III discusses the policy implications of
the analysis.

I.

THE OPTIMALITY INFERENCE AND ITS SHORTCOMINGS
A.

The Debate over Board Veto in CorporateTakeovers

As I review in detail elsewhere,7 there are reasons to believe that
strong antitakeover protections decrease share value. To begin, ex
post-that is, once a bid is on the table-incumbents can use their
veto power to block an acquisition that would be beneficial to shareholders. The evidence indicates that incumbents armed with a staggered board are much more likely to retain independence in the face
of a hostile bid and that the decision to remain independent com8
monly places shareholders in a worse position.
Furthermore, ex ante, having a board veto reduces the disciplinary force that the takeover threat can exert on incumbents. The evidence indicates that, when managers are protected from takeovers by
strong antitakeover statutes or by antitakeover provisions, managerial

7 See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Case
Against Board Veto in Corporate Takeovers, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 973 (2002) (analyzing each of the arguments in favor of board
veto made by its proponents and concluding that none of them provides a good basis
for board veto).
8 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV& Cuban Subramanian, The Powerful
Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN. L. REV. 887,
930-39, 950 (2002) (reporting that effective staggered boards nearly doubled the odds
of remaining independent for an average target in the study period and that effective
staggered boards substantially reduced the returns of shareholders of hostile bid targets).
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slack increases.9 When managers have less to fear from takeovers, they
fail to reduce costs and have poorer operating performance, including
lower profit margins, return on equity, and sales growth.
Are there any potential benefits of board veto that outweigh the
above costs of it? Supporters of board veto argue that, even if incumbents might abuse their veto power in hostile bid cases, they are likely
to use it to benefit shareholders by raising premia in negotiated transactions."' As I explain in detail elsewhere, however, there are good
theoretical reasons to doubt the presence, or at least the significance,
of the bargaining advantage that a board veto is claimed to have." In
a preliminary empirical study of this question, John Coates, Guhan
Subramanian, and I indeed found no statistically significant effect of
staggered boards on premia in negotiated acquisitions. 12 Furthermore, two recent studies found evidence that managers are willing to
trade off premia for personal gains in the wake of a takeover, 3 which
further reinforces doubts that giving managers more bargaining
power will result in more value to shareholders.
Proponents of board veto have also argued that it might have
beneficial effects ex ante. They suggest that board veto can encourage

9 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Is There
Discretion in Wage Set-

ting? A Test Using Takeover Legislation, 30 RANDJ. ECON. 535, 536-37 (1999) (finding
that the adoption of antitakeover statutes weakened managers' incentives to minimize
labor costs); Gerald T. Garvey & Gordon Hanka, CapitalStructure and Corporate Controk
The Effect of Antitakeover Statutes on Firm Leverage, 54J. FIN. 519, 520-21 (1999) (finding
that firms protected by antitakeover statutes are characterized by increased corporate
slack); Paul A. Gompers et al., Corporate Governance and Equity Prices, 118 Q. J. ECON.
107, 129 (2003) (finding that antitakeover arrangements are associated with lower
profits, lower sale growth, and higher capital expenditures).
10See, e.g., Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55
STAN. L. REV. 819, 824-25 (2002) (arguing that takeover defenses are likely to raise acquisition premia).
Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 1007-13.
12 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful

Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further Findings and a Reply to Symposium Participants, 55 STAN. L. REV. 885, 887, 904-05 (2002).
13 See JAY HARTZELL ET AL., WHAT'S IN IT FOR ME?
CEOS WHOSE FIRMS ARE AcQUIRED 3 (Stem Sch. of Bus., N.Y.U., Working Paper No. FIN-00-013, 2002) (presenting evidence that acquisition premia accepted by target CEOs are lower in transactions
involving more generous personal treatment of the CEO), available at http://pages.
stern.nyu.edui-eofek/Parachutes.pdf, JULIE WULF, Do CEOS IN MERGERS TRADE POWER
FOR PREMIUM? EVIDENCE FROM "MERGERS OF EQUALS" 21, 30 tbl.6b (The Wharton Sch.,
Univ. of Pa., Working Paper No. 2002-03, 2002) (presenting evidence that CEOs accept lower premia in mergers in which they get a position in the combined company),
availableat http://jonescenter.wharton.upenn.edu/papers/2002/wp2-03.pdf.
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long-range investment and prevent managerial myopia.'4 They also
claim that board veto can encourage firm-specific investments by
managers (and other employees) 5 As I explain elsewhere, however,
there is currently no empirical support for the view that these conjectured effects are sufficiently
significant to outweigh the adverse ex
6
ante effects of board veto.1
A current study by Alma Cohen and myself investigates empirically
the overall effect that board veto has on shareholder value.' 7 We find
that staggered boards established by company charters are associated
with a lower market value, with a median reduction of about five percent of market value. We also find evidence consistent with charterbased staggered boards causing, and not merely reflecting, a lower
firm value. This evidence provides support for the view that board
veto has an overall adverse effect on shareholders.
Thus, in terms of direct evidence about the effects of board veto,

supporters of board veto have no favorable empirical evidence to rely
on and confront a significant body of unfavorable empirical evidence.
It is thus unsurprising that proponents of board veto now welcome
and attempt to rely so heavily on certain indirect evidence-the evidence that companies adopt antitakeover provisions at the IPO stage.
B.

IPOBehavior and Optimality

Although state corporate law has, for the most part, sanctioned
the various elements of board veto, it has by no means mandated
these elements. Corporate charters could seek to tie management's
hands from blocking offers by restricting board power to use poison
pills. Alternatively, corporate charters could provide arrangements
that reinforce the pill by making it more difficult for a hostile bidder
to replace the board with a team that would redeem the pill. Recent
empirical evidence, which has attracted much attention, indicates that

For articles taking this position, see Martin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's
Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 115-16 (1979); Martin Lipton & Steven Rosenblum, A
New System of Corporate Governance: The QuinquennialElection of Directors, 58 U. CHI. L.
REV. 187, 205-14 (1991).
Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate
Law, 85
VA. L. REv. 247, 305 (1999).
16 Bebchuk, supra note 7, at 1011-13.
17 Lucian A. Bebchuk & Alma Cohen, The Cost of Entrenched
Boards (Oct. 2003)
14

(unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_
center/corporate-governance/papers/03.bebchuk-cohen.entrenched-boards.pdf.
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firms going public during the past decade have designed their charters to support, rather than eliminate, board veto. 8
To begin, while state law universally recognizes the validity of the
poison pill, charters routinely authorize the use of blank check preferred stock in creating poison pills. This practice is not surprising,
however, for the poison pill by itself does not result in a board veto
and is probably not, on its own, value-decreasing. The poison pill still
allows shareholders to decide whether to authorize the takeover. Indeed, it merely forces them to express their preferences through a
vote on replacing the directors.
Although the ability to force a shareholder vote through the poison pill is not by itself value-decreasing, there are other antitakeover
protections-those that substantially impede the ability of shareholders to replace the board quickly-that can provide management with
substantial veto power. In particular, the combination of the poison
pill and an effective staggered board provides management with considerable veto power. Unlike the poison pill, which can be adopted at
any time by the board and does not require shareholder approval,
staggered boards usually require a charter provision.
As noted, empirical evidence suggests that IPO firms opted for
staggered boards and other antitakeover provisions at an increasing
rate throughout the 1990s. In his study of IPO charter provisions,
Coates found that only thirty-four percent of firms adopted staggered
boards at the IPO stage in 1991-1992.19 By 1998, that number had
risen to sixty-six percent, and by 1999, the number rose again to
20
eighty-two percent of firms.
According to a widely held view, firms at the IPO stage have powerful incentives to adopt arrangements that benefit shareholders,2'
and the adoption of arrangements at this stage thus provides evidence
of their optimality. Applying this general view to the takeover context,
supporters of board veto argue that this pattern was due to-and thus

18

See sources cited supra note I (providing evidence about the prevalence of anti-

takeover provisions in corporate charters).
19 Coates, supra note 1,
at 1376.
20

Id.

21

See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: ManagerialBe-

havior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3J. FIN. ECON. 305, 306 (1976) (discussing
the incentives that those taking a firm public have to choose efficient corporate governance arrangements).
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was evidence of-the positive effects of a board veto on share value. 2
According to this view, the IPO evidence indicates that shareholderswho are in the best position to know their interests-wish to have
board veto. The existing direct evidence concerning the adverse effects of board veto, it is argued, should take a back seat to the clear
expression of shareholder preferences that IPO charters provide.
C.

ConflictingMidstream Behavior

The evidence with respect to shareholders' preferences, however,
is much more mixed than supporters of board veto would like us to
believe. Indeed, while it is argued that IPO charter provisions enable
an inference of shareholder preferences, shareholders have been expressing their preferences directly and clearly in their voting decisions.
Throughout the past decade, shareholders of existing companies
have been generally unwilling to vote in favor of amending the charter to include antitakeover provisions that would make replacement of
the board more difficult. In the wake of this dwindling shareholder
support, boards have all but stopped proposing such amendments.
From 1986-2002,
the annual number of such proposals dropped by
23
percent.
ninety
Furthermore, shareholders' opposition to antitakeover charter
provisions has been reflected in the large and growing support given
to precatory resolutions to dismantle existing staggered boards.24 For
instance, Patrick McGurn, Special Counsel for Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), has stated:
In the wake of the corporate scandals of the past several months, ISS often receives inquiries as to our views on the two or three key governance
changes that-if adopted by all issuers-would help investors to avoid
similar market meltdowns in the future. Unquestionably, the item on our

22

See sources cited supra note 3 (listing authors who infer from firms' adoption of

antitakeover provisions in IPO charters that such provisions benefit shareholders).
23 Klausner, supra note 5, at
758-59, 759 tbl.2.
24 See GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, ANNUAL
CORPORATE GOVERNANcE REVIEW:
SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND PROXY CONTESTS 6 fig.8 (2002) (reporting that, in

2002, precatory resolutions to repeal classified boards obtained on average sixty percent of votes cast), availableat http://www.georgeson.com/pdf/02wrapup.pdf.
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wish list that draws the blankest stares from corporate America
is the call
25
for annual elections of all members of corporate boards.

McGurn goes on to note that, over the last three years, precatory
resolutions to repeal staggered boards have, on average, received support from a majority of the shareholders participating in the vote.26
The evidence shows that this support is strong and has been increasing over the last decade.
That these proposals have been able to gain a majority vote is particularly striking in light of shareholders' general reluctance to oppose the board in votes on precatory resolutions. Many other such
resolutions, even those that are potentially beneficial for shareholders, receive little institutional support.2 But on the issue of staggered
boards, the institutional shareholders speak loudly, persistently, and
with a clear voice. This pattern provides very strong evidence that
shareholders do not favor charter provisions that facilitate a board
veto.
D. Attempting to Reconcile IPO and Midstream Behavior
Can supporters of board veto reconcile the shareholder voting
evidence with their claim that shareholders often prefer a board veto?
Marcel Kahan and Ed Rock raise the possibility that it may take time
for shareholders to learn about the precise effects of board veto on
share value. 28 According to this view, shareholder voting against takeover defenses is a transient phenomenon that will gradually go away as
all shareholders learn to recognize the beneficial effects of such defenses.
This explanation, however, is undermined by an examination of
the trends over time. During the 1990s, the incidence of antitakeover
provisions in IPO charters increased, as did the percentage of shareholders voting in opposition to staggered boards. Under the learning
conjecture, learning should gradually lead to convergence of IPO and
midstream behavior, but in fact, we have seen the opposite. As players' experience with antitakeover provisions has increased, both the

25

Patrick S. McGurn, Classification Cancels CorporateAccountability, 55 STAN. L. REv.

839, 839 (2002) (footnote omitted).
26 Id. at 84041.
27 See GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, supra note 24, at 6 fig.8 (reporting that proposals concerning executive compensation commonly fail to obtain majority support).
28 Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 484-89.
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IPO adoption and the midstream opposition have become more pronounced.
Figure 1 below presents a summary of the evidence in various
studies about the incidence of staggered boards in the charters of IPO
companies. 29 The Figure indicates that this incidence has been growing steadily, rising from an average of 35% during the years 19881992 to more than 80% in 2002. Figure 2 presents Georgeson Shareholder's data about the average percentage of shareholder votes cast
in favor of precatory resolutions to repeal staggered boards during
this period.3 0 As Figure 2 indicates, shareholder opposition has been
growing, rising from an average vote of 45% for such resolutions in
1996 to 62% in 2002. Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC)
data presented by Michael Klausner indicates that the trend of growing shareholder opposition was consistent during the first half of the
1990s as well.31

Figure 1 is based on the figure in Coates, supra note 1, at 1377, with the addition of the evidence about 2002 appearing in Joanne Allegra, SharkRepellent.net, IPO
Year in Review 2002, at www.sharkrepellent.net/pub/rs_20030106.shtml (Jan. 6, 2003).
30 For the 2003 figure, see GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER,
ANNUAL CORPORATE GOvERNANCE REVIEW: SHAREHOLDER PROPOSALS AND PROXY CONTESTS 7 fig.8 (2003),
availableat http://www.georgesonshareholder.conVpdf/2003WrapUp.pdf. For the 2002
figure, see supra note 24, at 6 fig.8. For the 2001 figure, see GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, ANNUAL MEETING SEASONWRAP-UP: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6 fig.8 (2001),
available at http://www.georgesonshareholder.com/pdf/OlWrapup.pdf. For the 2000
figure, see GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, ANNUAL MEETING SEASON WRAP-UP: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6 fig.8 (2000), available at http://www.georgesonshareholdercom/
pdf/OOWrapup.pdf. For the 1999 figure, see GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, ANNUAL
MEETING SEASON WRAP-UP:
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6 fig.8 (1999), available at
http://www.georgesonshareholder.com/pdf/99Wrapup.pdf. For the 1998 figure, see
29

GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, ANNUAL MEETING SEASON WRAP-UP:

CORPORATE GOV-

6 fig.8 (1998), available at http://www.georgesonshareholder.com/pdf/98Wrapup.pdf. For the 1997 figure, see GEORGESON SHAREHOLDER, ANNUAL MEETING
SEASON WRAP-UP: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 6 fig.8 (1997), available at http://www.
georgesonshareholder.com/pdf/97Wrapup.pdf. For the 1996 figure, see GEORGESON
ERNANCE

SHAREHOLDER, ANNUAL MEETING SEASON WRAP-UP:

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 7 fig.8

(1996), available at http://www.georgesonshareholder.com/pdf/96Wrapup.pdf.
31 Klausner, supra note 5, at 757, 758 tbl.1.
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Figure 1: Incidence of Staggered Boards in IPOs
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Figure 2: Shareholder Support for Precatory Resolutions
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Thus, the passage of time has not done anything to reduce the
considered differences between IPO and midstream behavior. To the
contrary, IPO firms and shareholder voting have been moving in opposite directions with respect to staggered boards. As firms and
shareholders have gained more information over time, IPO firms have
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increased their use of staggered boards at the same time that shareholder voting against staggered boards has become more pervasive.
Thus, the considered differences between IPO and midstream behavior are unlikely to be the transient product of a learning process on
the part of shareholders.
Kahan and Rock also suggest that strong antitakeover protections
are beneficial for some companies but not for others. According to
this view, IPO adoption of antitakeover arrangements is limited to
companies of the former type that go public, while midstream opposition to such arrangements occurs in firms of the latter type that do
not. This heterogeneity-based explanation, however, is also inconsistent with the evidence.
For one thing, IPO adoption of antitakeover arrangements has
become practically universal rather than limited to certain types of
companies. The incidence of staggered board adoption at the IPO
stage now exceeds eighty percent: At the same time, shareholders'
midstream opposition to staggered boards is also practically universal,
rather than limited to some types of companies. To be sure, precatory
resolutions to dismantle staggered boards-which are non-binding
anyway-occur in only a limited fraction of companies. In many
companies that do not have a staggered board, however, management
would have been happy to have obtained a charter provision establishing a staggered board if it could have, but it could not do so because
of shareholders' unwillingness to approve such charter amendments.
Could one argue that existing companies without a staggered
board are of a type for which a staggered board is not beneficial,
rather than of a type for which a staggered board is beneficial? This
argument would be implausible because the selection of existing
companies that do not have staggered boards does not reflect their
current type. Most publicly traded companies went public prior to
1990, and since 1990, companies that did not already have a staggered board have been unable to get shareholders to approve the
adoption of a staggered board. The absence of staggered boards
in existing pre-1990 companies reflects at most their pre-1990 type,
rather than their current type. The inability of such companies
to obtain shareholder support for a charter amendment establishing a staggered board thus indicates that shareholder opposition to

32

Kahan & Rock, supra note 3, at 500.

33

Allegra, supra note 29.
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midstream adoption of such an amendment is universal, rather than
specific to certain types of companies.
Finally, let us consider Lynn Stout's argument against inferring
from shareholders' voting decisions that shareholders do not benefit
from antitakeover arrangements. 34 According to her view, such arrangements benefit shareholders by encouraging managers (and other employees) to make firm-specific investments in human capital, and IPO
firms adopt them for this reason. Once shareholders derive some
benefits from managers' making such sunk-cost investments, she argues, they may be tempted sometimes to try to remove takeover defenses. But this argument cannot explain why the large fraction of existing firms that did not have a staggered board in 1990 have generally
been unable since 1990 to persuade shareholders to add such a defense. If the shareholders of IPO firms generally benefit from takeover defenses that will encourage firm-specific investments in the years
following the IPO, we should also expect that the shareholders of
many existing companies would benefit from adopting defenses that
encourage firm-specific investments in the years following the adoption. But shareholders of existing firms have generally been unwilling
to vote in favor of adding such defenses.
I conclude that it is not possible to accept the simple Panglossian
theory that the common adoption of antitakeover provisions in IPO
charters indicates that shareholders prefer to have such arrangements.
The view that IPO charters simply seek to satisfy shareholders' wishes
to have companies governed by antitakeover provisions is inconsistent
with the persistent opposition that existing firms' shareholders have to
such provisions. What is needed, then, is a richer account that can
explain both IPO and midstream behavior. The next Part seeks to develop such an account, identifying several explanations for the complex empirical reality that we observe.
II. EXPLAINING IPO AND MIDSTREAM BEHAVIOR
A. A Simple Model
In order to explore the incentive effects facing firms and shareholders, both at the IPO stage and midstream, it is helpful to consider
a paradigmatic, stylized model. This model will be useful in analyzing

Lynn A. Stout, The Shareholder as Ulysses: Some Empirical Evidence on
Why Investors
in Public CorporationsTolerateBoard Governance, 152 U. PA. L. REv. 667, 702 (2003).
34
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the various possible theoretical explanations for the empirical data
described above.
The model contains three different time periods. In the first period, T, the founders of a company are taking the company public.
The founders have decided to sell only a fraction, a, of their shares. I
assume that, as is common in IPOs, the fraction a amounts to a minority of the shares so that, immediately after the IPO, the pre-IPO
shareholders still hold a majority of the shares. The founder-manager
running the firm prior to the IPO is expected to continue running the
firm after the IPO.
When the founders take the company public, they must also
choose whether to incorporate antitakeover charter provisions in the
IPO charter. For simplicity, I shall assume that the choice made is between an arrangement, BV, under which the board has veto power
over takeover bids, and an arrangement, No-BV, under which the
board will not have such veto power. Because this choice might affect
the value of public investors' shares in the event that the company
moves to dispersed ownership down the road, this choice might also
affect the price paid for shares at the IPO. Let P denote the price that
public investors are willing to pay for the fraction a of the shares under a No-BV arrangement, and let P + AP denote the price they would
be willing to pay for the shares under a BV arrangement.
In the second period, T, there is a probability, 0, that the manager of the firm will face a profitable investment opportunity. To finance such an expansion, the firm would need to raise an amount, K,
in a secondary offering of shares. The investment would produce a
value of K + AK (where AK is positive). It is assumed that the amount
needed is sufficiently large that, if the expansion is pursued, the
founders would no longer have a majority of the votes and thus would
not have a lock on control. This would make the initial choice between BV and No-BV relevant. Such a development will be referred to
as "a move to dispersed ownership."
In the third period, T, the company operates its business. If the
company did not expand in T, the company will produce a cash flow
of V for its shareholders and a private benefit of B for its manager. If
the company did expand and move to dispersed ownership, the values
captured by the shareholders and the manager will depend on whether
BV or No-BV was initially chosen.
If the company adopted a BV arrangement at the IPO, the manager will be able to continue to enjoy a private benefit of B even though
the company is now in dispersed ownership. In contrast, under No-BV
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and dispersed ownership, the manager will be able to enjoy only a
lower level of private benefits, B - AB. Thus, AB represents the positive
effect that antitakeover protection has on the expected value of private benefits: antitakeover protection makes the manager's obtaining
the private benefits more likely, and freeing the manager from fear of
a takeover might increase the level of private benefits that the manager would extract.
With regard to cash flow, under a BVarrangement, the cash flow
captured by shareholders will be V+ K + AK In this case, even though
private benefits are assumed not to decline, cash flow will increase because of the expansion. A No-BV arrangement, which would reduce
private benefit by AB, would increase cash flows by AV While we have
every reason to assume that AB is positive-that not having takeover
protection will reduce the manager's private benefits-I make no assumptions about AV If antitakeover protection benefits shareholders-perhaps due to increased bargaining power for the board or decreased pressure to focus on short-term results-AVwill be negative.
That is, a No-BV arrangement will result in lower cash flows. In contrast, if the antitakeover protection reduces cash flows-due, for instance, to increased shirking or extraction of benefits by management-AV will be positive. The question of whether antitakeover
protection enhances share value is therefore equivalent to the question of whether AV is negative.
B. Efficiency-Based Explanations
1.

Inducement to Deconcentrate Ownership

Under this explanation, although BV has a negative effect on
shareholders when there is dispersed ownership, shareholders are
even worse off when the company does not move to dispersed ownership. Thus, shareholders prefer BV in the IPO charter at To because,
in the event that a profitable investment opportunity emerges, it will
encourage the firm to raise capital and move to dispersed ownership
35
at T,.

35 The analysis in this Section builds on LUCiAN ARYE BEBCHUK,
A RENT-PROTECTION THEORY OF CORPORATE OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 7203, 1999), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/
w7203.pdf, which establishes that controlling shareholders might be discouraged from
making an efficient move to dispersed ownership when such a move would reduce
their private benefits of control.
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A move to dispersed ownership can increase the value of public
investors' shares. In our model, the increase in value comes from the
fact that the investment opportunity is a profitable one and the public
investors share in the value of it. Furthermore, although we have assumed for simplicity that the manager enjoys the same high level of
private benefits under either dispersed or concentrated ownership
when operating under a BV arrangement, private benefits might well
be higher under concentrated ownership. The lock on control when
the founders maintain a controlling block of shares is stronger than
their lock on control under BV with dispersed ownership.
Let us suppose that AV is positive. In this case, if public investors
could count on the company moving to dispersed ownership in the
event that a profitable opportunity arises, they would prefer to have a
No-BV arrangement and would be willing to pay a higher price at the
IPO for their shares under No-BV than under BV. Getting to dispersed
ownership is not a certainty, however, and the likelihood of getting to
dispersed ownership might depend on whether the company has chosen a BV arrangement.
At T, the controller will clearly elect to expand if the initial arrangement chosen is BV The expansion will not reduce private benefits and will increase the cash flows captured by the initial shareholders, including the founders. The expansion will increase cash flows by
K + AK, but to raise the needed K, it will be necessary to provide
claims to cash flow in the amount of K Thus, the initial post-IPO
shareholders-the founders and the shareholders purchasing shares
at the IPO-will gain an amount of AK, and the founders will capture
a fraction (]-a) of this gain.
In contrast, under a No-BV arrangement, the manager might elect
not to pursue an efficient expansion opportunity if one emerges.
Under No-BV, the expansion will reduce private benefits by AB, a cost
that the manager will fully bear. The expansion will also increase the
cash flows captured by the initial shareholders by AK + AV, but the
founders will capture only a fraction (1-a) of this increase. Thus, because the manager will bear the full cost of the expansion in terms of
forgone private benefits but will not fully capture the benefits in terms
of increased cash flows, the manager's private interests might best be
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served by rejecting the efficient investment opportunity. This will occur if
(1-a)(AK + AV)-AB < 0
or, alternatively stated, if
AK + AV- AB < [a/(1-a)]AB.
Thus, if this condition is satisfied, public investors purchasing
shares at the IPO will prefer a BV arrangement to a No-BV arrangement even though AVis positive and a No-BV arrangement would increase the value of shares under dispersed ownership. When this
condition is satisfied, the company will not reach dispersed ownership
if No-BV is chosen, so the positive effect of No-BV under dispersed ownership is irrelevant in such a case.
In the simple model that I use, because the profit from an efficient expansion opportunity is fixed at AK, the adoption of a No-BV
arrangement will either prevent efficient expansion or will have no effect on the likelihood of such expansion. In a more general model
with a distribution of possible values for AK, a No-BV arrangement will
prevent efficient expansion when the value of AK is small enough but
not when the value of AK is large enough. In such a case, the cost of a
No-BV arrangement is that it will reduce the likelihood of efficient expansion and a move to dispersed ownership. This cost might lead
buyers of shares at the IPO to prefer-and be willing to pay more
for-shares with a BV arrangement.
Thus, the effect of BV arrangements on the likelihood of a subsequent move to dispersed ownership might make such an arrangement
preferable for buyers of shares at the IPO stage. This could explain
the adoption of BV in the IPO charter. Such an adoption would increase the value that buyers would be willing to pay for the fraction a
of the shares sold and, at the same time, would maintain the value of
the founders' block in the event that the company later moves to dispersed ownership.
This explanation is also consistent with the midstream opposition
to BV arrangements. Once a company moves to dispersed ownership,
and public investors' votes become important, the effect of BV on the
likelihood of a move to dispersed ownership is no longer relevant. At
this stage, as long as AV is negative, shareholders will have an incentive to vote against amendments to adopt BV arrangements, as well as
to vote in favor of removing existing BV arrangements.
Assuming that this explanation accounts for the IPO adoption of
BV arrangements, what are its implications for takeover policy? It
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suggests that, when BV arrangements are adopted at the IPO stage,
they perform an efficient role and that such adoption should be permitted and respected. Otherwise, firms would be discouraged from
making efficient investments that require a move to dispersed ownership or would be forced to resort to less efficient alternatives such as
the issuance of dual class stock. This explanation also implies, however, that BV arrangements reduce the value of shares in companies
Thus, BV arrangements
that already have dispersed ownership.
should not be used as a default and should not be imposed in midstream (as has been done by some courts and legislatures) on dispersed shareholders of existing companies that did not explicitly include such arrangements in their IPO charters.
2.

Efficient Rent Protection

Let us now put aside the first explanation considered above and
assume that the company will move to dispersed ownership whenever
an efficient opportunity to expand arises. Under an efficient rent
protection theory, AV is assumed to be positive, so that the value of
shares under dispersed ownership is lower with a BV arrangement.
However, the reduction in cash flow AV is smaller than AB, the increase in private benefits enjoyed by the manager under a BV arrangement. Thus, even with a move to dispersed ownership, the use
of a BV arrangement is efficient overall.
Under this explanation, public investors will be willing to pay less
for shares both at the IPO stage and in the subsequent, secondoffering stage. The founders will nonetheless be willing to bear this
cost because the advantage to them of capturing higher private benefits will outweigh the costs of having a lower value attached by public
investors to shares in the company.
The efficient rent protection hypothesis can help explain the empirical data. Under this theory, we should expect founders to include
antitakeover provisions in IPO charters because, even after "fully paying" for their higher private benefits enjoyed under BV arrangements,
they will be better off retaining these higher benefits. However, given
that the effect of BV arrangements on public investors is negative, we
would expect such investors to reject a move to such arrangements
midstream and to vote to remove them when the opportunity to do so
arises.
If BV arrangements produce an overall efficient increase in private benefits, one might wonder why managers of existing companies
without such arrangements do not "bribe" shareholders to approve an
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antitakeover charter amendment-i.e., offer to pay a certain amount
to the company if the shareholders approve such an amendment.
One possible explanation is that managers might be concerned that
offering to make such a side payment could be regarded as a violation
of fiduciary duties. Second, at later stages in the life of mature companies, managers might have cash constraints that prevent such a
payment. When founders reduce their ownership over time not by
selling their own shares and keeping the proceeds, but rather by raising more capital for the firm through issuing more shares, the founder-manager might not have enough cash to purchase shareholders'
consent to move to a BV arrangement.
The two efficiency-based explanations thus far explored have different empirical implications that can provide the basis for empirical
testing. Under the explanation based on incentives to deconcentrate
ownership, a BV arrangement has a positive effect on the value of
public investors' shares immediately following the IPO. Share value
(controlling for industry, size, and other relevant company characteristics) should thus be higher for firms with BV provisions than for
firms without such provisions. In contrast, under the efficient rent
protection theory, a BV arrangement has a negative effect on the value
of public investors' shares immediately following the IPO. Thus, share
value should be lower for firms with BV provisions than for firms without such provisions.
As for policy implications, the efficient rent protection theory and
the explanation based on incentives to deconcentrate ownership have
similar implications. Under the efficient rent protection explanation,
because BV provisions at the IPO can increase the overall pie, adopting them in the IPO should be permitted. In the absence of explicit
charter authorization of a BV arrangement, however, the default arrangement should be one of No-BV Under the considered explanation, as long as public investors are not compensated for such a
change, a move to a BV regime makes them worse off. Thus, the legal
rules that imposed BV arrangements on shareholders of existing firms
could not have been justified as an attempt to protect and benefit
these shareholders.
C. Agency-Based Explanations
Under the two explanations set forth above, the founders-the
pre-IPO shareholders-benefited overall from the adoption of a BV
arrangement in the IPO charter. In contrast, under the set of explanations to which I now turn, such an adoption makes the pre-IPO
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shareholders worse off as a group. Nonetheless, agency problems lead
these shareholders to make an adoption decision that leaves them
with a smaller pie overall. The first such explanation focuses on
agency problems among the firm's founders. The second such explanation focuses on agency problems between the founders and their
lawyers.
1. Agency Problems Among Pre-IPO Shareholders
Consider a situation in which the founders of a company consist
of five shareholders with equal holdings, all of whom are members of
the same extended family. One of the members manages the firm
and is expected to continue in that role after the IPO, while the other
members conduct a life of leisure and philanthropic activities. In this
case, the interests of the shareholder-manager, who might have a
dominant influence on the design of the IPO, are different fromand in particular, are more favorable to a BV arrangement than-the
36
interests of the other pre-IPO shareholders.
The reason for these divergent interests is the ability of the shareholder-manager to capture one hundred percent of the higher private
benefits that a BV arrangement would produce. In contrast, the
shareholder-manager would not fully bear the costs of such an arrangement to the pre-IPO shareholders. (These costs, which stem
from lower future cash flow and, correspondingly, lower prices for
shares sold at the IPO stage and at the second public offering, will be
shared by all the pre-IPO shareholders.) The shareholder-manager
would bear only twenty percent of these costs.
Thus, because the shareholder-manager would capture one hundred percent of the benefits of a BV arrangement to the group of preIPO shareholders but would bear only twenty percent of the arrangement's costs to this group, the shareholder-manager might prefer to
include this arrangement even if it would reduce the overall wealth of
the group. Essentially, the distortion arises from the fact that the
shareholder-manager might ignore the external cost that the adoption of a BV arrangement may impose on the other pre-IPO shareholders.
The question raised by this explanation, of course, is why the other
founders do not prevent such an agency problem from occurring. If a

36 See Field & Karpoff, supra note 1, at 1885 (discussing the possibility of agency

conflicts between managers and nonmanagerial shareholders at the IPO stage).
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BV arrangement would make them worse off, why would they not prevent the shareholder-manager from adopting it or, alternatively,
"bribe" this shareholder-manager not to do so? The answer may
sometimes lie in the other shareholders' characteristics or circumstances. At times, the other shareholders might be passive and uninformed and thus have little ability to control or monitor the decisions
of the shareholder-manager with respect to many of the fine points of
the IPO design.
The considered agency explanation, like the other explanations, is
one under which the optimal default in the absence of a charter provision to the contrary is that of a No-BV arrangement. However, unlike the two efficiency-based explanations discussed above, this explanation does not imply that it is desirable to permit IPO charters to
adopt BV arrangements. To the extent that such arrangements are
adopted due to an agency problem, such adoption cannot be expected to produce efficiency benefits.
A recent study by Laura Casares Field and Jonathan Karpoff provides evidence that is consistent with the considered agency problems
playing a role in the IPO adoption of antitakeover protections.3' The
study finds that, during the 1988-1992 period, the likelihood that a
firm going public adopted antitakeover provisions was inversely related to the fraction of the pre-IPO shares held by the manager. The
smaller this fraction, of course, the greater the incentive of the manager to include antitakeover provisions even if they are valuedecreasing. The study also finds that the likelihood of antitakeover
provisions was positively related to various parameters that are correlated with greater managerial power at the time of the IPO.
2.

Agency Problems Between Pre-IPO Shareholders and Lawyers

Another possible agency problem is the agency cost between the
pre-IPO shareholders and their lawyers. In making the choice between a BV and a No-BV arrangement, the founders may defer to the
recommendation of counsel. Lawyers, in turn, might have distorted
incentives to prefer a BV over a No-BV arrangement even if a NO-BV
arrangement would be somewhat better for the pre-IPO shareholders.
Founders taking their company public may elect to defer to counsel with respect to the choice between BV and No-BV because of their

37
38

Id. at 1867-73.
Id. at 1884.
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recognition that counsel might have superior information and expertise. In particular, the lawyers-with their paramount expertise in advising public companies-might have better information about the future ramifications of BV or No-BV arrangements.
Furthermore,
lawyers might be perceived to have a better understanding of the effect of BV or No-BV arrangements on the price that public investors
would be willing to pay for shares. Indeed, recent empirical evidence
indicates that counsel is likely to have significant influence on the design of charters at the IPO stagey.
The fact that founders may defer to lawyers' superior information
creates a potential for agency costs. The very reason why founders
might wish to rely on the lawyers' recommendation implies that founders will not be able to fully monitor whether lawyers are giving them
the right recommendation (one that reflects the lawyers' undistorted
judgment). 4° Because lawyers have some discretion, the lawyers' own
incentives might influence the recommendation they ultimately provide. 4 '
Lawyers' incentives point toward favoring BV over No-BV The reason for this preference is that lawyers can expect to feel the costs of a
No-BV arrangement more than its benefits. As to costs, a No-BV choice
means a greater likelihood that, down the road, the company will be
taken over and the lawyer will lose a valuable client. Furthermore, the
lawyer may suffer reputational costs as a result of her client being
taken over without difficulty. If managers find themselves without
takeover defenses, they might well blame their lawyers.
In contrast, the benefits of a No-BV arrangement, which stem from
a slightly higher IPO price, may not be visible and, more important,
are unlikely to be attributed to the lawyer if visible. The founders are

See Coates, supra note 1, at 1371-72 tbl.6, 1377-83 (presenting evidence that the
identity of counsel influences the inclusion of antitakeover provisions in the IPO charter); see also Robert Daines, The Incorporation Choices of IPO Firms, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1559, 1580-82 (2002) (presenting evidence that the identity of counsel influences the
choices that IPO firms make about where to incorporate).
40 See Coates, supra note 1, at 1310 ("[M]ost clients will be ill-equipped
to monitor
implementation and will defer to the advice of the lawyers for the same reasons the
client has retained the lawyer to begin with (lack of expertise, division of labor).").
41 This problem is not unlimited, however. The lawyers can only affect the decision of the founders within a range of reasonable options. Each client will have a set of
reasonable options-likely those most often utilized in the market-between which
they cannot distinguish. It is among these indistinguishable options that lawyers can
influence decisions and may be motivated by their own incentives, rather than those of
the founders.
39
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not going to observe the extra value obtained by the use of a No-BV
arrangement. And, in any event, the professional assessment of the
lawyers' work is unlikely to be much affected by the IPO price.
To illustrate this point, consider a situation in which, for whatever
reason, both BV and No-BV arrangements have become viewed as conventional and standard, and each type of arrangement is used by a
substantial fraction of the companies going public. At this point, we
can expect to see an increased use of BV arrangements because lawyers would have less to lose from recommending a BV arrangement
than from recommending a No-BV arrangement.
The evidence is consistent with this analysis. In the early 1990s,
there were a substantial number of IPO firms that included antitakeover provisions in their charter, but also a substantial number of firms
that did not. 42 According to a study by Coates, firms elected to adopt
BV arrangements in their charter provisions at increasing rates throughout the 1990s; by the end of the decade, a great majority of IPO charters had adopted staggered boards.43
Coates views this trend as evidence of an agency problem that differs from the one on which I focus. In his view, the adoption of a BV
arrangement at the IPO stage was good for pre-IPO shareholders, and
the reason why some firms did not adopt BV arrangements was that
their lawyers were not doing an adequate job.44 Over time, even bad
lawyers caught up and learned to serve their clients well by adopting
BV arrangements. Coates's evidence, however, is also consistent with
a different account. Under the account considered in this subsection,
pre-IPO shareholders were best served by not including a BV arrangement, and lawyers deviated from their clients' interests when
they recommended BV, rather than when they recommended No-BV
Over time, lawyers increasingly switched to recommending a BV arrangement since this was the safest route for them-it produced the
smallest likelihood that their clients would complain about the legal
advice received.
Finally, I should note that the policy implications of this account
are similar to those of the first agency-based explanation. Like the
first, this explanation implies not only that No-BV is the best default

42

See Coates, supra note 1, at 1357-58 (providing evidence about the incidence of

antitakeover provisions among a sample of firms in the early 1990s).
43 See id. at 1375-76 (providing evidence about the increase in the use of classified
boards during the 1990s).
44 Id. at 1377-83.
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arrangement, but also that permitting the adoption of BV charter provisions could lead to inefficient outcomes.
D. Information-BasedExplanations
1. Asymmetric Information
Under this explanation, it is common knowledge among founders
and public investors at the IPO stage that, in the event the company
converts to dispersed ownership, a BV arrangement would be inefficient compared with a No-BV arrangement. However, while both founders and public investors have the same information about the identity of the efficient arrangement, founders have some private information about the magnitude of the private benefits to them, as well as
the costs to public investors, of the BV arrangement. Through a model
developed in a companion piece, I show that such asymmetry of information might lead founders to adopt inefficient provisions at the
IPO stage.4

To appreciate this intuition, consider the following numerical example. Suppose that firms going public sell thirty percent of their
shares and that such firms are equally likely to be either of high-value
type, H, or low-value type, L. Founders know their firm's type, but
public investors do not. H and L firms differ in the likelihood of having an investment opportunity that will lead them to move to dispersed ownership. For simplicity, suppose that H firms have a one
hundred percent likelihood and L firms have a ten percent likelihood
of facing such an opportunity. Suppose also that, when an opportunity emerges, it will be sufficiently profitable for the founder-manager
to pursue it under either a BV or a No-BV arrangement. Finally, suppose that a No-BVarrangement will be less efficient (i.e., AV> AB). 46
Even though investors know that a No-BV arrangement is efficient for both H and L firms, it can be shown that an efficient
pooling equilibrium-one in which both types of firms go public
with a No-BV arrangement-might not exist. In such an equilibrium,
45 LucIAN

ARYE

BEBCHUK,

ASYMMETRIC

INFORMATION

AND

THE

CHOICE OF

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ARRANGEMENTS 4 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus.,

Harv. Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 398, 2002), available at http://www.law.harvard.
edu/programs/olin-center/papers/pdf/398.pdf.
46 In the model I develop in a companion piece, id. at 7, H and
L differ in the
value of their assets, rather than in the value of their investment opportunities. The
latter difference might be more relevant to the choice between BV and No-BV arrangements, and I adjust the discussion below accordingly.
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public investors, unable to distinguish between H and L types, will pay
the average value to them of a No-BV arrangement. As a result, founders with H firms are not fully capturing the value of the cash flows
they confer on public investors by adopting a No-BV arrangement and
forgoing their private benefits under BV Consequently, founders
with an H firm would have an incentive to deviate from the efficient
equilibrium. They would have an incentive to reduce somewhat the
price at which IPO shares are offered but include a BV arrangement.
This incentive to deviate would prevent an efficient pooling equilibrium.
Indeed, under some conditions, the unique equilibrium is one of
inefficient pooling in which all founders choose to go public with an
inefficient BV arrangement. L firms would have an incentive to follow the H firms and pool with them in the offering of BV arrangements. Even though a BV arrangement is less valuable for founders
with L firms, such founders will wish to avoid being identified by IPO
investors as an L firm with a lower value.
Thus, the asymmetric information explanation may indicate why
IPO firms might adopt BV arrangements that shareholders oppose in
midstream. An'inefficient pooling might arise at the IPO stage; at the
midstream stage, however, shareholders would have no reason to vote
for BV arrangements that they know to be inefficient.
To the extent that BV arrangements adopted at the IPO stage are
explained by the considered model, the policy implications are similar
to those of the agency-based explanations. Under the considered
model, No-BV is the optimal default arrangement. Furthermore, it
might be beneficial not to allow opting into BV at the IPO stage. A
prohibition on such adoption of BV might move the equilibrium from
an inefficient pooling equilibrium-in which all firms offer BV-to an
efficient pooling equilibrium in which all firms offer No-BV, and both
H and L firms will benefit from such a move.
2.
a.

Bounded Attention and Imperfect IPO Pricing

Bounded attention at the IPO stage

Bounded attention arises at the IPO stage when rational buyers do
not have unlimited informational and computational capacities. 4' As a
For a detailed explanation of "bounded rationality," see David M. Kreps, Bounded
Rationality, in 1 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 168 (Peter Newman ed., 1998).
47
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result, potential buyers only take into account aspects of the company
that are sufficiently salient or important; other aspects that may have
some effect on value are simply not factored into the estimates of
value formed by the buyers.48
Under the bounded attention explanation of BV arrangements,
IPO buyers do not pay attention to the particular choices that companies make among a range of conventional takeover arrangements.
IPO buyers might pay attention to some unconventional arrangements or to the adoption of dual class structure, but as long as the
company retains a one-share, one-vote structure, buyers will not give
weight to the nuances of takeover provisions.
One reason for ignoring such nuances is the inherently large degree of uncertainty regarding firms that go public. Such firms have
not been subject to the scrutiny and valuation of the market prior to
the IPO. Thus, potential IPO buyers might concentrate their efforts
on assessing the business prospects of the firm going public.
Furthermore, takeover arrangements might be less important at
the IPO stage because their effects on shareholders are not immediately relevant. The adoption of a BV arrangement will impact shareholders only when (and if) the company will move to dispersed ownership down the road. As a result, the existence of a BV arrangement
has a lower relative impact on a firm's value at the IPO stage than in a
midstream point at which the existence of a BV arrangement is immediately relevant.
To see this, suppose that whether a BV arrangement exists will not
be relevant during the first five years after a firm's IPO and that there
is some probability it will become relevant in five years. An assessment
of the value of the IPO company should depend on (i) an assessment
of what will happen to the company in the next five years (e.g.,
whether and how much managerial slack there will be, whether the
company will be acquired, etc.); (ii) an assessment of what will happen
to the company in subsequent years (after the fifth year) in the event
that the BV arrangement does not become relevant (and the company

48

This subsection's argument is a particular type of the general argument that

capital markets do not usually price each and every corporate provision. For earlier
works expressing skepticism about the existence of such pricing, see Lucian Arye
Bebchuk, The Debate on ContractualFreedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395,
1410-14 (1989); Victor Brudney, Corporate Governance, Agency Costs, and the Rhetoric of
Contract, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 1403, 1411-27 (1985); Robert C. Clark, Agency Costs Versus
Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINESS 55, 55-70
(John W. Pratt & RichardJ. Zeckhauser eds., 1991).
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still exists, of course); and (iii) an assessment of what will happen to
the company in those later years in the event that the existence of a
BV arrangement becomes relevant. Whether a BV arrangement is
present at the IPO stage affects only element (iii) which is only part of
the overall assessment of the value of the IPO firm. In contrast, consider a company that is in a midstream point at which whether a BV
arrangement exists is immediately relevant. At this point, whether or
not a BV arrangement exists affects one's assessment of what will happen to the firm not only down the road, but also in the immediate future.
Indeed, at road shows, buyers tend not to inquire about the fine
details of firms' corporate charters, so long as those details fall within
the established set of arrangements. Buyers do not inquire-and
might not even bother to check-whether, say, shareholders can act
by written consent or how quickly shareholders can call a special
meeting.
Assuming that IPO buyers do not pay attention to differences
among takeover arrangements within a certain set of conventional arrangements, founders have an incentive to gravitate toward the arrangements in this set that protect them most from takeovers. Because founders benefit from such arrangements in terms of expected
private benefits of control, it would be rational for them to adopt
whatever takeover protections will not cost them in terms of the IPO
price. The gravitation toward the adoption of staggered boards during the 1990s is consistent with this explanation.
b. Midstream
Why would shareholders who pay little attention to certain
antitakeover provisions in IPO charters vote against them in midstream? One important reason is that, in midstream voting, the issue
comes to shareholders in isolation. At the IPO stage, potential buyers
have many aspects and dimensions of the company to consider. In
contrast, when faced with a vote on a charter amendment to establish
a staggered board or on a precatory resolution to de-stagger the
board, the only question that shareholders face is whether a staggered
board is good for them. Standing in isolation, this question is salient.
Furthermore, at the IPO stage, potential buyers might act on the
presumption that, even though conventional antitakeover provisions
have a negative expected effect, the effect is not sufficiently significant
for them to try assessing its magnitude and factoring it into their decision whether to buy shares at the IPO. In contrast, when shareholders
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face a voting decision, the recognition that conventional antitakeover
provisions may negatively affect their interests, even if only slightly, is
sufficient to instigate a "nay" vote.
It is also worth noting that midstream votes on such questions often come at a stage in which the issue of takeover bids already has
more practical significance. Unlike a BV arrangement in a charter at
the IPO stage, the effects of a BV arrangement on share price are
likely to be more salient to shareholders by the time a vote on the issue occurs, since the company has already moved to dispersed ownership and the negative effects of BV in terms of entrenchment are thus
relevant. As explained, the existence of a BV arrangement has more
importance for assessing the value of a company in midstream than it
had for assessing the company's value at the IPO stage.
Thus, the bounded attention explanation is consistent with the
persistent midstream voting against BV arrangements. This pattern
can be explained by the fact that, in midstream, the issue of antitakeover provisions comes to a vote in isolation from other issues. Voting
against a provision therefore requires no more than a qualitative
judgment that its impact is negative.
c.

Investment bankers

A common argument is that the presence of underwriters protects
buyers of stock at IPOs and provides them with a reliable signal concerning the quality of the initial charter's provisions. 49 According to
this argument, the underwriter will have an incentive both to study
the charter's proposed provisions and to bargain for the optimal provision. The underwriter, as it were, will represent the interests of the
buyers of stock. As explained below, however, the existence of underwriters cannot be expected to prevent the inclusion of conventional but inefficient provisions to which buyers do not pay attention.50
To examine this argument in our context, suppose that founders
take a company public and that they must decide whether to include
a charter provision BV that, in the event that the company moves to

49 See, e.g.,
RonaldJ. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Effi-

ciency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549, 554 (1984) (discussing how investment bankers "facilitate
efficiency in the capital market").
50 The discussion below draws on LUcIAN ARYE BEBCHUK, FREEDOM OF CONTRACT
AND THE CORPORATION: AN ESSAY ON THE MANDATORY ROLE OF CORPORATE LAW 5758 (John M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ., & Bus., Harv. Law Sch., Discussion Paper No. 46,
1988).
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dispersed ownership down the road, would have an adverse effect of
one percent on the finn's cash flows. Furthermore, suppose that buyers cannot be expected to pay attention to this issue in their IPO purchase decisions. Would the presence of an underwriter, which we can
assume knows the effect of BV, lead the founders to exclude BV from
the company's charter?
The answer is "no" because the underwriter would have no incentive to prevent the inclusion of BV In examining the underwriter's
incentives, researchers have suggested two reasons why the underwriter might care about the shareholders' interests. First, the underwriter commits itself to purchasing the shares if the public does not,
and this commitment gives the underwriter an incentive to make the
stock more appealing to the public.5' But if, by hypothesis, public investors do not pay attention at the IPO stage to the effects of BV, the
inclusion of BV would not affect the salability of the stock, and therefore, the underwriter would have no reason to object to it. That is, the
interest of the underwriter-as far as the underwriting commitment is
concerned-is solely to cater to the market's demand which is based
on the potential buyers' information. The underwriter's interest does
not lie in acting on the basis of its superior information concerning
the long-term effects of a BV arrangement.
Second, it is often said that the underwriter has a valuable reputation and that the underwriter would defend the interests of stock pur52
chasers to prevent damage to its reputation.
Whether this reputational element would provide the underwriter with an incentive to
oppose BV however, is far from clear. The presence of a reputable
underwriter only guarantees to buyers that charter provisions are not
misleading or value-reducing in some unconventional, hidden way.
The reputable underwriter's presence does not guarantee that the
charter excludes non-optimal but conventional provisions.

51

See John H. Langmore & Robert A. Prentice, Contribution Under Section 12 of the

Securities Act of 1933: The Existence and Merits of Such a Right, 40 EMORY L.J. 1015, 1088
n.386 (1991) (discussing underwriters' incentives to avoid being stuck with unsold
shares).
52 See, e.g., James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous, 39 ARIZ. L.
REv. 497, 506 (1997) (viewing an underwriter's reputation as "an important signal of
the offering's quality").
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E. Private vs. Social Optimality
Before concluding my exploration of possible explanations for the
observed patterns, I should note one factor that might well be at
work but that cannot explain the observed combination of IPO
and midstream behavior. There is literature showing that socially inefficient restrictions on control contests might be adopted at the IPO
because such
. 53restrictions might impose a negative externality on outside bidders. Because such bidders are not "at the table" during the
IPO, designers of the IPO charter have no reason to take their interests into account. Although extracting a higher premium from outside bidders would be a mere transfer from a social point of view, it
would be desirable from the private perspective of the target's shareholders. Thus, shareholders might prefer a socially undesirable arrangement that inefficiently reduces the likelihood of a takeover but
raises premia. It follows that, on the margin, shareholders prefer to
restrict takeovers more than is socially optimal.
The above analysis implies that, even if standard antitakeover provisions were desired by shareholders, possible grounds exist for not
permitting some such provisions. The evidence, however, indicates
that shareholders do not in fact prefer to have these provisions. If the
effect of these provisions on expected future premia were sufficient to
make them desirable for shareholders, shareholders of existing companies would not systematically oppose the midstream adoption of
such provisions. Opposition from such shareholders indicates that
they do not judge the effect of these provisions on surplus extraction
from bidders sufficient to make them beneficial overall for shareholders.
While the externality point cannot by itself explain the pattern
under consideration, it is relevant to the discussion of policy implications. My analysis abstracts from effects on bidders and, as will be discussed below, still reaches a skeptical position toward complete contractual freedom to adopt antitakeover arrangements. Because the
externality issue suggests an additional social cost of such arrangements, it reinforces this position.
53 For an analysis of such negative externality, see
Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Marcel
Kahan, A Framework for Analyzing Legal Policy Towards Proxy Contests, 78 CAL. L. REv.
1073, 1073-77 (1990); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Luigi Zingales, Ownership Structures and
the Decision to Go Public: Private Versus Social Optimality, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE

OWNERSHIP 55, 56 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D.
Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of the Corporation, 11 BELL J.
ECON. 42, 43-44 (1980).
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IPO Firms with PrivateEquity Funding

In an article focusing on the adoption of antitakeover charter
provisions by IPO firms backed with private equity funding, Michael
Klausner questions whether the explanations I put forward in this Article are applicable to such firms. He also proposes an explanation
that in his view can account for the behavior of such firms. As I discuss below, however, the explanation that Klausner sets forth in fact
has to rely on one of the explanations that I put forward.
Klausner questions whether my explanations are applicable to VCbacked IPO firms (i.e., firms that received earlier funding from one or
more venture capital firms) on grounds that, when such firms go public, their founder-manager commonly holds a minority of the shares
and the venture capitalist(s) hold a majority of the shares. In such
circumstances, the explanation based on inducement to deconcentrate ownership is indeed inapplicable because the company is expected not to have a controlling block once the VC(s) unload their
shares in the market, which they commonly do before too long.
Klausner argues, however, that the explanations based on efficient
rent protection and asymmetric information are also inapplicable to
VC-backed IPO firms. These explanations assume that those making
the decision whether to adopt a BV arrangement take into account
the arrangement's effect on the manager's private benefits of control.
But, Klausner argues, when VCs hold a majority of shares in the IPO
firm, the manager who is going to obtain private benefits of control
does not have a decisive say over IPO design.
In Klausner's view, the reason why VC firms permit the inclusion
of antitakeover arrangements even though they will not directly share
any part of management's private benefits of control is that they
wish to maintain their reputation of being friendly to management.
This reputation for treating management well-especially successful
management-in turn helps VCs attract firms in which they could invest. To incorporate this element in the simple model, we need to
add a venture capital financing stage, TvT, that comes before T, the
time in which the firm goes public. According to the explanation
proposed by Klausner, when the founder-manager and the VC contract at T' , the VC makes an implicit commitment, backed by the
VC's reputation, to permit the founder-manager to adopt a BV arrangement in the fortunate event that the firm ends up going public.

54

Klausner, supra note 5, at 775-81.
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Having a reputation for acting in this way is supposed to help the VC
attract a deal flow and compete with other VCs.
The reputation argument can explain why the VC can, at T,
make its commitment implicit, rather than in a legally binding form.
Bernard Black and Ronald Gilson argue that, being repeat players,
VCs are able to make various understandings they have with managers
implicit, enforced only by a reputational sanction. 55 But this argument
does not speak to the question of what implicit commitments will be
optimal for a VC to make at TT.
Standard and familiar reasoning suggests that, at T , a VC will
have an incentive to make implicit commitments only to actions down
the road that can be expected to increase, rather than decrease, the
expected joint surplus of the parties. Suppose that, in the event of an
IPO, adopting a BV arrangement will produce an overall benefit of
$100 million to the manager and an overall loss of $50 million to the
VC. In such a case, the VC will have an incentive to commit at T, to
permit a BV arrangement should the company go public later on even
though at that stage a BV arrangement would produce a loss of $50
million to the VC.
Having such an implicit commitment, however, would not be in
the parties' and the VC's interest if it is expected that, in the event of
an IPO, adopting a BV arrangement will produce an overall benefit of
$100 million to the manager and an overall loss of $200 million to the
VC. In such a case, a commitment to permit a BV arrangement in the
event of an IPO would in fact reduce the parties' expected joint surplus from the transaction.
Thus, the introduction of VC reputation and commitment is not
by itself sufficient to explain the adoption of BV arrangements by VCbacked IPO firms. One needs to explain additionally why, when viewed
by the group at T, adopting a BV arrangement in the event of an IPO
can be expected to maximize the total value to the parties. It is only
in this case that the VC would have an incentive to maintain a reputation of allowing BV arrangements at the IPO stage.
What can explain why VCs and the manager-the pre-IPO shareholders-will be made better off as a group by adopting a BV arrangement at the IPO stage? The possible explanations are those that
my analysis has identified. A BV arrangement could be in the interest of the pre-IPO shareholders as a group under the efficient rent

55 Bernard S. Black & Ronald J. Gilson, Venture Capital and the Structure
of Capital
Markets: Banks Versus Stock Markets, 47J. FIN. ECON. 243, 245 (1998).
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protection explanation, the asymmetric information explanation, or
the bounded attention explanation. In short, rather than being inapplicable to the VC-backed firm context, the explanations I put forward
are an essential complement to the reputational story that Klausner
offers to account for why VCs are willing to go along with BV arrangements when they have considerable say over IPO design.

III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
A. No Board Veto Is Best Default
It is natural to begin by discussing the implications of the analysis
for choosing the optimal default arrangement. Even assuming that opting out is permitted, state law must choose default arrangements. The
analysis of this Article indicates that the optimal default arrangement
is one that does not include a board veto over takeover bids.
During the last two decades, state courts and legislatures have
chosen defaults that go in the direction of board veto. States have
adopted antitakeover statutes that set default rules imposing restrictions on hostile bidders. Clearly, legislators had an alternative: they
could have provided an antitakeover arrangement that firms could affirmatively elect by adopting a charter provision to this effect. Nonetheless, many state legislatures elected to set antitakeover arrangements as the default.
State courts have acted similarly in adopting defaults that favor
management and disfavor takeovers. 56 With the invention of the poison pill, courts had to decide whether and when this device could be
used by management. As in the case of legislatures, courts had two
options. First, they could have allowed boards to adopt poison pills
only if the use of poison pills was authorized by shareholders in a
charter provision or otherwise. Alternatively, courts could have set the
permissibility of poison pills as a default, permitting boards to use this
device as long as it was not prohibited by the charter. Courts chose
the latter route.

56 For example, the following cases find that defensive actions taken
by a board of
directors in response to a perceived threat are presumptively valid, subject only to a
showing of reasonableness and proportionality: Katz v. Chevron Corp., 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d
681, 689, 693-94 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994); Hedberg v. Pantepec Int'l, Inc., 645 A.2d 543, 546
(Conn. App. Ct. 1994); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-58 (Del.
1985); Burcham v. Unison Bancorp, Inc., 77 P.3d 130, 147-49 (Kan. 2003).
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In a recent article, Assaf Hamdani and I put forward a "reversible
defaults" approach to the adoption of defaults for existing compaUnder this approach, when courts and legislatures face a
nies
choice between two possible defaults, they should err on the side of
choosing the arrangement that is more restrictive with respect to
management, even if the other arrangements appear somewhat more
likely to be value-maximizing for shareholders.
The reason for this preference lies in the fact that, under state
corporate law rules, any proposal for a charter amendment must be
brought to a shareholder vote by the board. This requirement gives
management an effective veto power over any potential charter amendment. As a result, choosing the arrangement more restrictive with respect to management would be most likely to result in the arrangement most favored by shareholders. If the restrictive arrangement is
chosen as a default and then turns out to be disfavored by shareholders, relatively little will be lost because both shareholders and managers will support a charter amendment opting out of this arrangement.
In contrast, if the nonrestrictive arrangement is chosen and then turns
out to be inefficient, it might persist despite its inefficiency because
managers would have no incentive to initiate a charter amendment.
It follows that, even if public officials view BV as somewhat more
likely to be value-maximizing than No-BV, No-BV should still be set as a
default. The analysis of this Article, however, indicates that a "no
board veto" regime is more likely to be optimal for shareholders of
companies with dispersed ownership. This conclusion makes the case
for choosing "no board veto" as a default all the more compelling.
Under all six possible explanations of the empirical evidence, BV
places shareholders of an existing company with dispersed ownership
in a worse position. To be sure, under some of these explanations it is
desirable for shareholders that IPO charter provisions providing a BV
arrangement be permitted and respected when adopted. Even under
these explanations, however, in all cases in which such an explicit provision is not included in the charter of an existing company with dispersed ownership, there is no reason to provide BV as a default.
It follows from this analysis that legislatures and courts erred in
the late 1980s and early 1990s when they imposed BV arrangements
on the shareholders of existing companies. A more sensible approach would have provided for the possibility of a BV arrangement,

57 Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Optimal Defaultsfor Corporate Law Evolu-

tion, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 489, 492-93 (2002).
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but would have required firms to opt into such an arrangement
through a charter amendment. In any event, the setting of default
rules is a process that never ends. For instance, as Vice Chancellor
Leo Strine recently observed, Delaware cases have not clearly resolved
whether boards may generally maintain a poison pill to block an acquisition offer after losing an election conducted over the offer."'
This Article indicates that, when courts resolve this question, shareholders' interests would be best served by a negative answer.
B. Limited Menu
The analysis above also indicates that there are reasons to be skeptical about allowing unlimited contractual freedom with respect to
corporate charters. This Article thus provides some support for the
existing strategy of state law, which offers a menu of options rather
than unlimited contractual freedom. State law currently provides firms
with some board veto options, but not others. For instance, although
staggered boards are allowed, state law generally requires that some
directors be elected at each annual meeting.59 Thus, state law does
not permit arrangements under which elections for directors are held
only every two or three years, even though it does permit dual class
structures that can provide even stronger entrenchment.
An influential view in corporate law scholarship strongly supports
contractual freedom in IPO charters. 60 This position is based on a
view of the IPO process as close to perfect, with all those involved in
the design of the IPO charters having powerful incentives to select
value-maximizing provisions. In contrast, the picture of IPO decisions
emerging from the analysis of this Article is more mixed, and it does
not support the view that all IPO charter provisions should be strongly
presumed to maximize value.
To be sure, under the two efficiency-based explanations discussed
above, even though BV arrangements do not increase the value
of shares under dispersed ownership, it is desirable to allow and
respect the adoption of BV arrangements at the IPO stage. However,

58 Leo E. Strine, Jr., The ProfessorialBear Hug: The ESB
Proposalas a Conscious Effort
to Make the Delaware Courts Confront the Basic 7ust Say No" Question, 55 STAN. L. REV. 863,
878 (2002).
59 For an example of such state law, see DEL. CODEANN.
tit. 8, § 141(d) (2001).
60 See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REv. 1416, 1422-24 (1989) (arguing that firms should be given broad freedom to choose the corporate governance rules to which they will be subject).
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each of the two agency-based explanations-and each of the two information-based explanations-indicates that some limitations on the
freedom to adopt antitakeover provisions might be desirable.
More empirical evidence on the extent to which each of the six
explanations plays a role in the real world is needed before definite
conclusions can be reached about the optimal limits on BV arrangements. The available state of knowledge, however, does justify a reasonable measure of skepticism toward claims of unlimited contractual
freedom to adopt antitakeover charter provisions. For now, when public officials attach substantial likelihood to the undesirability of some
arrangements, it would be sensible not to include them in the menu
of permissible choices for charter provisions.
A case in point might be the use of staggered boards. There are
reasons to believe that, even if it is desirable to allow firms to adopt
arrangements that provide boards with veto power over an acquisition
for a substantial period, including staggered boards in the menu of
choices is not a good way to accomplish this goal. The problem with
staggered boards is that there is no point in time at which shareholders can replace the full board. Even an arrangement under which all
directors come up for an election once every two years is superior because it at least provides some point in time when a total replacement is feasible. Thus, eliminating the (currently permitted) option
of a staggered board would be desirable even at the cost of adding
the (currently prohibited) option of having elections only once every
two years.
C. Sunset Arrangements
For arrangements that expand board power, this analysis also
implies that it is desirable not to limit the law's choice between permitting such arrangements outright and prohibiting them. The law
should make greater use of the strategy of allowing firms to adopt
some arrangements only for a certain period after they are last
approved by shareholders. Thus, for example, even if staggered board
provisions were permitted, one might want to consider having them
lapse after, say, seven years from the date of their last approval by
shareholders.
The reason for using such a sunset strategy is the existence of significant differences for both shareholders and management in the
IPO and midstream stages. The identity of the desirable arrangement
might well change over time. As this analysis has highlighted, the
optimal arrangements for a publicly traded company that just went
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public and still has a rather concentrated ownership structure might
well be different from those optimal for a large, mature publicly
traded company with dispersed ownership. Therefore, we should not
expect that IPO-stage arrangements will generally remain optimal for
a firm decades after it first goes public.
Because of the board's control over charter amendments, there is
concern that entrenching arrangements which were chosen at the
IPO stage for an efficiency reason will remain in place long after they
outlive their value. A sunset strategy would ensure that, in such a case,
there will be a resetting after a certain period of time following the
IPO. This resetting would in turn ensure that an entrenching mechanism remains in place only if it serves shareholder value.
To be sure, if the IPO process were perfect, we would expect that
IPO charter provisions would themselves provide for automatic lapse
after a certain period of time or when certain conditions obtain.
Given the likelihood that no single arrangement will fit all corporate
stages, one would expect optimal IPO charters with antitakeover arrangements to include provisions for their elimination or amendment
after, say, twenty-five years, the death of certain founders, or the
reaching of a certain ownership structure. Yet, I am unaware of any
significant use of such time-contingent arrangements in IPO charters.
This absence is likely to be rooted in bounded attention problems;
IPO buyers are not going to pay attention to, or be willing to pay extra
for, terms governing adjustments in twenty-five years. Be that as it
may, the absence of such provisions makes it desirable to consider the
use of sunset rules as a means to ensure that long-living public corporations will not be stuck with inefficient arrangements.
D. Lessons for Corporate Governance in General
Because of the importance of takeovers, researchers have worked
to gather substantial evidence about the incidence of antitakeover
charter provisions and their direct effects, and shareholders have
sought to express their opposition to some arrangements in corporate
votes. As a result, antitakeover charter provisions provide an excellent
"case study" for examining the larger questions of whether charter
provisions adopted at the IPO stage should be presumed optimal and
whether any limits should be placed on the adoption of such provisions.
The analysis of this Article is thus relevant for general questions
that arise with respect to all corporate governance issues and arrangements. The six reasons that I have identified for why IPO firms
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might adopt provisions that reduce the value of public investors'
shares can apply not only to antitakeover provisions, but also to provisions governing other corporate governance issues. Indeed, if anything, the problem of bounded attention might be even more severe
with respect to other corporate issues than it is with respect to takeover arrangements. Similarly, given the smaller importance of nontakeover governance issues, agency problems with respect to such issues might well be more severe than with respect to takeover issues.
Thus, one general lesson suggested by the analysis is that we
should not infer from the adoption of certain provisions in IPO charters that they provide the arrangement which best serves shareholders.
There is a substantial amount of corporate work that relies on such
inferences to make claims about optimal arrangements. For example,
scholars have argued that, since no firms are known to have prohibited insider trading in their charters prior to the laws finding the prac-

tice illegal, insider trading must be beneficial for shareholders.6 ' The
analysis of this Article indicates that such inferences are often unwarranted.
Another general lesson of the analysis concerns the long-standing
debate concerning contractual freedom in corporate law.6 ' The single
but important example of antitakeover provisions provides an opportunity to enrich the debate by using the large amount of empirical
evidence and information that we have about IPO provisions and shareholder preferences in the takeover area. The takeover area thus provides us with a good lens through which to investigate the optimality
of charter provisions and of charter design in IPOs. As we have seen,
this investigation provides reasons to be skeptical about claims for
complete contractual freedom in IPO charters.

61 See Dennis W. Carlton & Daniel R. Fischel, The Regulation
of Insider Trading,35
STAN. L. REv. 857, 859 (1983) (criticizing those opposed to insider trading for not having offered an explanation "for why firms have made so little attempt to prohibit insider trading").
62 For articles presenting a wide range of views on the subject,
see Symposium,
ContractualFreedom in CorporateLaw, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1395 (1989).
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